UNFREE ASSOCIATIONS
INSIDE PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTES
by Douglas Kirsner
[ Contents | Chapter: | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | Conclusion | Bibliography
Chapter 3
On the make: The Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute
It used to be a writer's town and it's always been a fighter's town... Whether the power is in a .38, a typewriter ribbon or a pair of six-ouncers, the place has grown great on bone-deep grudges... 'City of big shoulders' was how the white-haired poet put it. Maybe meaning that the shoulders had to get that wide because they had so many bone-deep grudges to settle.
The 'Hustlertown' Nelson Algren so trenchantly depicted has much in common with the story of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute (CPsaI), the only APsaA institute in Chicago. From its beginnings, Chicago's leading psychoanalytic institute was 'on the make'. A crucial structural fault in the CPsaI allowed boosterism, authoritarianism and conflicts of interest to flourish. This flaw ultimately brought about the fall of its director as well as a revolution by the members to bring a greater measure of democracy and ethics to the CPsaI's structure.
The CPsaI was set up in 1932 with a lay Board of Trustees. The board was able to raise a considerable amount of money not only to run the CPsaI but also to boost the institute's influence and budget. Frequently, members and officers of the lay board lay on the couches of the CPsaI directors and executives who were legally responsible to them.
The power of the CPsaI director was enhanced through the ability to direct rewards (grants, position, and status), using the largesse brought about by boom times for psychoanalysis. Power was further augmented by an abundance of funds raised by the wealthy and socially prominent members of the Board of Trustees in the period that psychoanalysis had so much cultural capital. The CPsaI had the status of a cultural asset for the Chicago intelligentsia as much as it was a therapeutic resource.2 In a city where machine politics is second only to architecture as an art form, the directors of the CPsaI increasingly became consummate machine politicians. They managed the board which raised much of the budget, and manoeuvred various institute committees, sections, enterprises, and members through a system of favours, privileges and punishments.
The structure of governance placed the director in two-way commerce with the Board of Trustees, at the same time as having real power and authority over institute activities. A corruptive influence became endemic when the director and staff analysed key board members who were supposed to supervise them. The director appointed board members who then acted in a supervisory capacity. The stage was set for conflict since key members of the board wanted control given that they raised most of the sizeable institute budget, and the director, who managed the institute, wanted autonomy and control vested in him. The way out for the director was to appoint board members beholden to him and to manoeuvre the board to his purposes. Many psychoanalytic institutes rely on tuition and the society for most of their upkeep but an institute that wants increasing power and influence in the outside world needs a vehicle to achieve it. The lay board provided autonomy for the institute from the society but was caught up in the politics of an expanding budget and power. Directors (and for many years 'the staff') were perceived as bosses by the membership not because of their personalities but because of the structure of governance. The director had financial power and lawful power over administrative matters without the need for the members' approval. (Members did not select the director but were only part of the selection process since the board made the choice). Thus 'authoritarianism' was set into the structure of the position of director in relation to the membership. The fact that the director was in office for so long meant that the office was often identified with the person. The fact that the director was thought of as not listening to the membership or being authoritarian was not primarily a matter of personality-governance was structurally in the director's pocket.
The system came to an abrupt end when in 1988 George Pollock, the director since 1971, was accused of behaving unethically in taking donations from a patient, charges he vehemently denied. This denouement eventuated when the system itself was near breaking point. Favours were not as available to be called in at a time when psychoanalysis was losing its allure nation-wide with fewer patients, candidates and funds.
The history of the CPsaI also bears some striking similarities to that of Russia. The CPsaI, too, had its share of enlightened and not so enlightened despots, imperial and communist. After the 1917 Revolution the old czars were replaced with communist ones and it was only with Gorbachev and afterwards that democracy was realised, albeit falteringly and with many problems of its own. Similarly, the CPsaI had a succession of czars, which terminated only with the 1988 departure of George Pollock. Although Pollock himself introduced reforms, his reign was not generically different from those of previous incumbents. It was only with the overthrow of the system itself that real changes were effected. After the revolution after Pollock left there was much suspicion of authority. So many checks and balances were implemented that the functioning of the CPsaI became unwieldy.
Early history
There were two short periods of interest in psychoanalysis in Chicago in the early part of the century: in 1911-12, during which Ernest Jones presented a paper to the Chicago Neurological society, and in 1921 when a series of brochures was issued.3
Chicago's earliest Freudian psychoanalyst, N. Lionel Blitzsten (1893-1952), was founder and first president of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society. A legendary figure, Blitzsten wrote little but was much quoted by those whom he supervised, analysed and taught. After a few months of psychoanalysis in the 1920s in Berlin, probably with Franz Alexander, Blitzsten was given permission by Alexander) to take analytic patients in Chicago because Alexander thought that the Chicago population consisted mainly of Indians!4
Franz Alexander (1891-1964) played a seminal role in Chicago psychoanalysis. A Hungarian, Alexander was the first training student of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. He held the first visiting professorship in psychoanalysis in the US in 1930 at the University of Chicago. After a year during which the psychoanalytic ideas he was presenting were received very badly, Alexander went to Boston but returned to help found the CPsaI in 1932 with the financial support of Alfred K. Stern as well as the Rosenwald, Rockefeller and Macy Foundations.5
A cadre of Europeans (mainly Berliners) rather than Americans founded the CPsaI that was set up as a daughter institute of the Berlin Institute from which Alexander and many other analysts in Chicago came.
Alexander was director from the founding of the CPsaI in 1932 until the fall of 1956 when he left for California. He was a very productive writer and researcher with both a humanistic and a scientific approach using rigorous testing methods, especially on psychosomatic specificity research.6 Especially interested in research, Alexander wanted to establish Chicago as a premier research institute along European university lines.7 In addition to involving Chicago analysts in collaborative teaching and research,8 Alexander was also a charismatic leader who attracted many European analysts to Chicago. Karen Horney for example was appointed as associate director at the desirable salary of $15,000 in 1932 dollars.9 This exemplified Alexander's considerable abilities in raising finance, even during the Great Depression.
As the first director Alexander set a precedent by analysing a leading member of the lay board which oversaw and was legally responsible for the CPsaI. In 1986 George Pollock, who was accused of taking donations from a patient, referred to Alfred E. Stern's importing Alexander: 'Mr. Stern put up the money for a local psychoanalytic institute. Then he lay down on the couch to become Alexander's first patient'.10 Stern later was accused of subversive activities. To avoid a trial, fled the US to live in Prague where he remained.11
The independent institute
Unlike almost all other APsaA institutes, the CPsaI did not emerge out of the psychoanalytic society but arose independently. Responsible for the training and qualification of analysts the institute, was set up as a totally separate entity from the society, and remains separate from it. The psychoanalytic society consisting of the graduates was of no consequence to power. From its beginnings the institute was authoritarian, oligarchic and self-perpetuating.
Alexander modelled the CPsaI on the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute he left. However, the Chicago Institute's lay Board of Trustees was an innovation that provided funds and more power to the director through his having some control over naming and influencing board members. For decades CPsaI funding derived from its own activities and the contributions brought in principally by its Board of Trustees. Like a university the CPsaI was set up and legally incorporated through the state of Illinois and received its charter through the Board of Trustees. This structure contrasts with the majority of other APsaA institutes. Classically the Board of Directors is elected from the psychoanalytic society with the proviso that they not be Training Analysts, that they not have the double function of overseers on a board at the same time as being active participants.
The CPsaI's Board of Trustees was composed of lay members who were not psychiatrists or psychoanalysts. The board owned the charter, had fiduciary responsibilities, selected the institute director, and had legal authority for the organisation and administration of institute affairs.12 Once appointed the director dominated both institute and board. The board went along with decisions that were made by the director in consultation with the staff, a group of analysts with lifetime tenure, or from 1971 the Psychoanalytic Education Council, a group elected by the membership. The board never interfered with the functioning of the institute during Charles Kligerman's experience of four decades in the CPsaI.13
Until George Pollock instituted a limit of two five year terms when he became director, there was no limit on the tenure of directors. Alexander was director for 24 years followed by Gerhart Piers for 15 years. Pollock succeeded in reigning for 17 years until he was deposed.
As in the Berlin Institute, the staff met every day for lunch, discussions and meetings.14 Restricted to institute staff and certain guests the lunch tradition endured for decades. While it contributed to the cohesiveness within the institute group, it demonstrated the clear divisions between insiders and outsiders.
In Charles Kligerman's opinion, the CPsaI had a unique combination of an authoritarian leadership that had the Berlin tradition of
experimental or research-mindedness, a greater flexibility of outlook than one would find in traditional analytic institutes, even though we were supposed to be a traditional Freudian one. Even though analysts in Chicago had disallowed Alexander's particular premise, his spirit lingers on. There's a tolerance of an experimental approach.15
The staff
However, another pivotal and unusual aspect of the organisation made the CPsaI distinctive. Until the Pollock regime in 1971 the institute was to all intents and purposes run by an oligarchy of the director and the institute staff. The director did not have absolute power within the institute but was shared with the 'staff', a group of about twenty analysts with lifetime tenure. The membership of the fixed number of staff was only changed through replacement when a member died. Since the director and staff decided who would replace those who died, the staff was self-perpetuating. There was not even a retirement policy despite the fact that there were so many old analysts on the staff, probably because many of them were so prestigious.16 (The ageing of the staff only became a problem from around 1965).17 Thus the system of governance was a self-perpetuating hierarchy with clashes about who should occupy leadership positions and how power should be shared.
Alexander set up the CPsaI with a staff instead of a faculty appointed simply to teach particular courses. Before World War II the staff coincided with those who taught since the numbers of candidates and teachers were small. However, later when numbers markedly increased many training analysts were not on the staff. While in most institutes the position of training analyst commanded power, in the Chicago set-up of board, director and staff, training analyst status was more a side show lacking the quality of anointment of being on the staff. It did not involve the high status and power that membership of the staff conveyed.18 As John Gedo (who trained at the CPsaI 1956-61) recalled, outside the director and staff 'everybody else was in outer darkness'.19 The 'us' versus 'them', 'in' versus 'out' division was clear and absolute. On the one hand, the director and staff were the oligarchic leaders of the institute (accountable to the board only in theory) while, on the other, all other analysts were together in the same boat, including the training analysts who were not members of the staff. There was no democracy or even a system of consultation. The director and staff selected the researchers, adjuncts and training analysts from the pool of graduates including training analysts who were not on the institute staff. According to Charles Kligerman, a member of the staff who was involved with psychoanalysis in Chicago since 1946, there was 'no organised faculty. There was a pool of analysts in the city who were graduates of the CPsaI who would be tapped if we needed them. It was a privilege'.20
Given the authoritarian structure, some of the inevitable alienation of the graduates of the institute was compensated for by a pay-off. In the heyday of psychoanalysis after the war until the 1970s, the system delivered the goods in terms of society members being given assignments and other crumbs from the royal table. In the heyday for psychoanalysis across the US, graduation from the CPsaI guaranteed referrals and a very good life-style.
Within this autocratic context Alexander ruled like an 'enlightened despot'. He valued the research culture and held liberal ideas in psychoanalysis. However, he had enemies among the staff. Alexander's 1956 departure from Chicago to Palo Alto was, in Roy Grinker Sr.'s opinion, 'at least partially due to his staff's discontent and their open revolt against his liberality'.
Alexander's liberal and unorthodox ideas included three days a week analysis (instead of four or five times a week), his criticism of the libido theory and the use of 'role-playing' to manipulate the transference to provide a 'corrective emotional experience'.21 The fact that Alexander fought the APsaA on such issues (along with Grinker and Sandor Rado) and tried to take the institute out of the control of the APsaA clinched the staff's antagonism, according to Roy Grinker Sr.22 Alexander's stubborn belief that children's problems were solely due to their parents meant that he felt it necessary to treat the parents and not the child-a belief that led to a neglect of child psychiatry in Chicago, holding it back there for decades.
While most critical of Alexander, Blitzsten, the institute's founder, never split for two reasons, according to Jerome Kavka, an analyst and historian of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society. First, because Blitzsten had little administrative talent and did not do well with classroom instruction, and second because the institute and society were separate, the society providing an outlet for different viewpoints.23 Stuart Brent, a literary bookstore owner who knew Blitzsten well, observed him often behaving like a potentate orchestrating his followers fawning over him.24 Blitzsten's followers were able to infiltrate the staff and ultimately brought Alexander down and remained influential into the 1960s. There were also major differences between the group around Alexander and the group around Maxwell Gitleson who became president of the APsaA and of the IPA. Gitleson was aligned with a more conservative group and, despite being a training analyst and president of the APsaA, did not join the CPsaI faculty under Alexander.
Heinz Kohut remembered that Alexander was 'treated badly and undeservedly'. It was not arguments that toppled Alexander but a counter-Alexander movement-'it was like communism and revisionism, religion and heresy', as Heinz Kohut recalled.25 The major confrontation with Alexander occurred when the staff engineered a move to a more conservative curriculum. A committee consisting of Joan Fleming, Heinz Kohut and Louis Shapiro reshaped the curriculum to represent the ego psychological approach of Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein.26 While remnants of Alexander's approach remained, Shapiro and Fleming became increasingly influential and both became deans of education. With the ascendancy of that group the ambience changed so much that Alexander was forced by the staff to leave.27
The Piers regime
The board appointed Gerhart Piers director on November 8, 1955, to be effective in the fall of 1956. Although Piers was more congenial and pleasant though less brilliant than Alexander,28 Piers was in John Gedo's words, 'a Viennese version of Franz Alexander', who like Alexander Piers exercised effective power in the institute. However, like European monarchs, Alexander and Piers never burned their hands with much administration, delegating many of the day-to-day activities to Helen Ross and Joan Fleming respectively.29
Some compromise was clearly achieved which overcame the tensions between the Alexander group and its opponents. Alexander's collaborator, Thomas French, became director of research. Joan Fleming (later a prominent APsaA official) who was analysed by Blitzsten and remained very close to him, was appointed as dean of education, a position equivalent to the chair of the Education Committee in other institutes. Piers became in John Gedo's terms, 'a do-nothing ruler'30 by the time that he had delegated most of his power to Fleming towards the end of his reign.31 Nontheless, Gedo smelled corruption in the regime.32 Political games were endemic and Institute leaders disapproved of independent thinking.33
Nonetheless, the Piers years brought a change in locale for the CPsaI, a major expansion of child therapy programs for social workers and the establishment of a Teacher Education Program which focused on the human factors that promoted or impeded teaching. The Graduate Clinic was formally organised and institute teaching was organised around a weekend schedule to accommodate candidates coming from distant cities, including St. Louis and Denver, which became new geographic facilities of the CPsaI.34 Piers also altered the membership of the lay Board of Trustees by bringing in a wider range of Chicagoans.35
Towards the end of his reign Piers became ill and incompetent But since there was no internal policing mechanism, nobody would take the responsibility to tell him to wind it up.36 Piers finally resigned in 1970. However, the situation provided the opportunity for changes to prevent it from happening again, and major changes were introduced. The Board of Trustees introduced five-year terms for directors in 1971.
The Pollock regime
At the comparatively young age at 48 George Pollock was appointed associate director in February 1970, and then director in January 1971.37 Along with Phillip Seitz, Pollock was the youngest member of the staff and Pollock served an important role in the Piers regime when he replaced French as director of research by 1961.38 Although the staff did not exclude younger analysts from teaching, training analyst appointments or even aspects of administration until the mid-1960s, such appointments were at the staff's pleasure bringing no rights to power. Gedo taught immediately after graduating, 'But the minute I offended Fleming, I was out!'39
Forceful and energetic, Pollock's strong intellect was stretched over a large number of projects. He enthusiastically took on all the aspects of the job of director, including the business side, which was of little interest to most analysts.40 As John Gedo put it, Pollock 'was willing to do everything. The expression, "Let George do it!" applied quite literally to the CPsaI during those years. Everybody let George do it'.41
A 'can do' person in the right place at the right time, Pollock was a very strong and effective director who was able to impose his influence on the CPsaI in the name of change and expansion. Like others in the dynasty of directors, George Pollock boosted and was enthusiastic about the CPsaI. He emphasised how the CPsaI would thrive through continual fundamental change. In 1975, Roy Grinker Sr. observed that Pollock had 'extensive energy, ambition, optimism and enthusiasm. There is considerable disagreement concerning his achievements but I can only praise him for opening up the institute, liberalizing the faculty, moving ahead with many new ventures, permitting and encouraging the younger men to think creatively, independently and even criticize the establishment'.42
The Chicago Psychoanalytic Literature Index was begun as was The Annual of Psychoanalysis, and the CPsaI Library expanded. In 1973, the State of Illinois authorised the CPsaI to offer the first Ph.D. program in psychoanalysis in the world. Extension programs, postgraduate and teacher education, child therapy services and training programs, and research were further expanded. In the area between the east and west coasts the institute was unrivalled, and continues to act as a centre for 'satellite' and former 'satellite' institutes such as those in Milwaukee and Cincinnati.
Like many in his generation of CPsaI graduates, Pollock was impatient with the structure in which the staff made all the decisions. He immediately introduced radical changes in the organisation. In a remarkable tour de force, Pollock persuaded the institute staff to relinquish their life appointments. He replaced the staff by a new educational decision-making body, elected by the institute membership, the Psychoanalytic Education Council.43 Every CPsaI member of the APsaA of five years standing became routinely considered for training analyst appointment.
Pollock was able to secure these changes by seizing opportunities provided by a confluence of factors including the vacuum left by the ineffectiveness of Piers' last years as director. Moreover, significant changes in the ecology of psychoanalysis and of the membership of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society were occurring. By the early 1970s, the generation of candidates that flooded psychoanalytic institutes across the US after World War II had reached an age to have some power in their professional associations. As we have seen in the cases of the New York and Boston Psychoanalytic Institutes, at that time federal funding was drying up for psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis began to lose its allure as other treatment modalities for mental illness such as biological and other psychotherapies were becoming more developed and widely accepted. As a result, analysts could not so easily derive their professional, financial and intellectual rewards from the universities and hospital departments of psychiatry, and institute graduates moved their focus back to the psychoanalytic institutes for professional rewards. However, the large graduate population had nowhere to go in the CPsaI. By that time the aged and entrenched staff of the CPsaI did not involve younger analysts as teachers, training analysts or administrators.
By instituting an organised faculty and the establishment of the elected Psychoanalytic Education Council, Pollock brought about a broader institute membership and a greater degree of democracy. Nevertheless, Pollock was able to manage both council and faculty directly or through committees he appointed as director. For example, the director or his committee could stipulate which people stood for which slots-nominees had to run against specific incumbents making it hard for new members to be elected.44 Incumbents were usually reelected to the council throughout Pollock's terms. At the same time Pollock tried to give more power to the faculty.45
Everybody was compensated for their work at the CPsaI, whether it was teaching, administration, committee work or interviewing candidates. The CPsaI was always very well off with income derived from grants, contributions, tuition and fees.46 The CPsaI budget under Pollock passed that of the APsaA. Pollock became 'the biggest entrepreneur in world-wide psychoanalysis', as Robert Wallerstein put it in a 1987 interview. 'He can juggle more things at one time than anybody else can'.47 Charles Kligerman recalled, 'The reputation of the institute was very large. Tremendous activities were going on and George Pollock could claim they were his. He got his own thumb in everything. He covered the whole universe in a vigorous way'.48
Nevertheless, in a 1981 interview Phillip Holzman (at the CPsaI during the 1970s) noted that 'a primary weakness in the institute' was that Pollock did not 'seem to know how to share responsibility'.49 Robert Wallerstein showed some prescience in a 1987 interview:
People line up as George's friends and supporters and also there are people who can't get along with him and who feel that although he has brought in a lot of money, it has not been uniformly for the good. All these little subsidiaries he has set up like his Psychosocial Center and his training programs for teachers, the clinical program for child therapists-all those things may well come crashing down when George has gone. There is no institutional guarantee there.50
The machine
The CPsaI is consonant with the city itself. For a long time Chicago's machine politics has been similar to New York's 'Tammany Hall'-a major melting pot of powerful ethnic groups as well as tough unions and other organised associations. It is a city with a strong identity, yet it also has strong and virtually autonomous subcultures that belie this unity. Successful Chicago politics has consisted in the ability to negotiate and balance the demands of various forces and to be able to buy off opponents. The position of Chicago Mayor has always been a delicate balancing act. As a Chicago 'boss', Mayor Richard Daley Sr. dispensed favours to groups that would be beholden to him.
So it was with the CPsaI from its inception. Like the Mayor of Chicago, the director of the CPsaI was undeniably 'the boss'. A vital feature of the position was political-to keep the various factions from being too dissatisfied. Until Pollock left there was always a strong and powerful political leader of the CPsaI who has, owing to institute structure as well as personal temperament, been dominant and oligarchic rather than democratic.
This structure provides some of the reasons behind why the CPsaI never split despite its many internal struggles. One of Pollock's chief lieutenants, Sol Altschul observed that the CPsaI never split because of the character of Chicago.
Because this is second city we feel more vulnerable and under attack. To use an American western metaphor the wagons have been drawn up in a circle. Under these circumstances we need every gun we have even if we have our own rivalries so that if we split we'll have two small institutes and we'll be even weaker vis a vis New York than we are now'.51
Charles Kligerman noted Chicago's self-consciousness as second city which 'pays a great deal of attention to certain single things' exemplified by the city's pride about the University of Chicago as its pre-eminent university and architecture as its dominant art form-and, among the intelligentsia, the CPsaI. Moreover, the atmosphere in the CPsaI 'fostered an environment in which Kohut could do his work'. He maintained that if Heinz Kohut
reached his ideas with the level of conviction that he did in another place, they would have quickly come to a parting of ways and he would have had to form a completely deviant group that would have been outside the APsaA. Both Horney and Alexander would have been considered heretics where they were. But not here because we can tolerate divergence because of our liberal experimental approach.52
Whatever the cultural reasons, there were important economic considerations for staying in a well-funded institute. The extensive assets and budget provided sufficient reason that the CPsaI never split. Beyond the CPsaI's prestige, nobody wanted to leave the money, the rented premises, the referrals, the infrastructure or the perquisites.53
A middle-aged Chicago analyst with a very Chicago perspective described the structure to Roy Grinker Sr. in 1975:
It seems to me the issues devolve essentially into the experiences with, and reactions to the bi-level structure into which most social groupings inevitably tend to divide, i.e., the archaic but ubiquitous antagonism between the "ins" and the 'outs'. From an historical perspective the general lines of move and counter move, like a chess game, do not really change much. Only the cast of characters and the specific contemporary issues, which mask the interminable power struggle, change.54
There was always an 'in group' and an 'out group'. Only the staff and later holders of certain ranks and offices were invited to lunch. Certain analysts were given a disproportionate amount of teaching, prestigious positions and training cases whereas others were not.
To be 'in' in the Chicago analytic scene meant being part of the institute- which, as we have seen was totally separate from the society which had no power. Power was vested in the institute controlled by the director, a position that embodied charismatic leadership. This was not so much a personal fiefdom as a part of the institutional structure-any incumbent would be inclined to act in a monarchical way. Especially under Pollock's directorship between 1971 and 1988 when the institute became large, the control exercised seemed to be of the type that social theorist Herbert Marcuse described in a wider social context where the social structure and function of the whole determine the particular parts. Marcuse described 'repressive tolerance' where the presence of democratic liberties that are preconditions for the development of a free society, also gives the false impression that it has been already achieved.55 Consisting of accredited analysts the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society was a free scientific forum but was irrelevant to decisions and money. The 'talking shop' provided an outlet for criticisms and frustrations to be vented but to no avail.
As an effective manager and entrepreneur, Pollock was able to 'deliver the goods' until the late 1980s when the power and prestige of psychoanalysis declined too far to provide them any more. Groups and individuals with claims were rewarded and effectively coopted to the institute culture dominated by Pollock. The attitude of many Chicago analysts to Pollock was clearly ambivalent: while Pollock helped provide a relatively comfortable existence, he was considered by some to be somebody it was useless to oppose.
Although the complex administrative structure of the institute gave the impression of delegation of responsibility, the divisions enhanced the de facto power of the director. Although prestigious positions could be attained, the labyrinthine complexities of institute matters meant that nobody knew much outside his or her immediate area. Because the director had his finger on the pulse, only he was in a position to know everything necessary to make decisions.
Nevertheless, as Charles Kligerman observed, all this was not just peculiar to Pollock: 'This culture did not begin with Pollock nor was it specific to him. It was part of the way the institute was set up and part of the Chicago culture'.56 The behaviour of Pollock or his predecessors rests not so much on personalities but on the role of the director and the structure of the institute. When someone has occupied a position for so long, the position and the person seem to meld together even though the person may be working within parameters set by the structure.57 The structure of the CPsaI meant that the director had real authority. Although the Board of Trustees had power, the director was in charge of the actual everyday running of the CPsaI. The director was the channel for two-way communication between the board and the institute, headed the Psychoanalytic Education Council, and had large appointive powers.
The CPsaI was transformed from an Austro-Hungarian structure under Alexander into what John Gedo recognised as 'an American patronage system'. Gedo recalled that Pollock 'had money, political power, local patronage, and patronage jobs in the APsaA'. Moreover, because of his positions in the American Psychiatric Association and the APsaA (he became APsaA president in 1974), Pollock was able to use his influence nationally. Locally, he had political power and influence with well-off board members. Provided his authority was not threatened, Pollock could give rewards but also jobs to people who could handle them. John Gedo recalled, 'We each learned in our own way how to remain friendly with George Pollock'.58
For a long period Pollock's two main and trusted supporters were involved in running the organisation under Pollock's direction as associate dean and dean of education.59 Chicago analyst Meyer Gunther observed that
It is big city patronage politics. Strangely enough, this began under Alexander as almost as a limited democracy of the nobility and the aristocracy. And it deteriorated progressively in my opinion despite a major broadening of the institute when Alexander left and the Blitzsten supporters came in.60
In 1988 Meyer Gunther studied committee appointments made at the CPsaI between 1975 and 1987 during George Pollock's directorship. He found the presence of motives were more complex than finding "the best person for the job". Especially in the 'Big Three' most powerful committees which held sway over education and training-the Training Analyst Committee, the Selection and Matriculation Committee and the Progression Committee-Gunther found that a small number of analysts were represented quite disproportionately in committee membership. In the top twelve committees of the institute over the time studied, 20 percent of the time was served by just three analysts and the next 20 percent by another five, meaning that eight analysts served 40 per cent of the time on committees during George Pollock's tenure. Gunther concluded,
All the core program committees seem to have involved the work of the same dozen or so analysts who, often in the role of chairperson, ran their committees for most of the 13-year period. The inference I would draw from this would be the major motive was one of stability, continuity of function and safety of function-all very predictable.... This arrangement would guarantee getting the work done in a satisfactory way according to some presumably desirable, predetermined standards of what was considered to be effective functioning. Once the pattern was established, I suspect the dictum, "Don't fix it if it isn't broken", probably was the rationalization for perpetuating these central figures in their dominating roles at the institute.
Gunther added that there was no clear-cut evidence about what criteria were used to decide these appointments. He continued:
However, one can suspect that there was operating in the background the universally present dynamics of any self-perpetuating power elite who were convinced not only of their capacity to be effective and ability to demonstrate it, but convinced that their predictive effectiveness was evidence of their exclusive possession of these special talents. But, in reality, these people were all experienced analysts who could be depended on to carry out the operation of their committees in a reliable, conscientious, effective and ultimately 'mainstream' manner. Whatever their differing ideological complexions might be, they clearly shared one thing in common. They were all good team players. They were not oddballs, major idiosyncratic thinkers; they certainly were not 'loyal troublemakers' nor Lone Rangers. 61
In addition to the membership of committees, the allocation of teaching was also skewed in favour of a relatively small number of instructors teaching most of the courses.62 In 1984 George Moraitis noted that four or five people had seemingly permanent official status deciding 'who gets in, who gets out, what is being taught, how it's taught'.63 Gunther speculated:
The aim of this structure-a well-organized, predictable smoothly functioning educational 'production line'-might well have been enthroned by Pollock at the expense of the enriching, but less predictable effects of creativity, diversity, independence of thought and hence the inevitability of less efficient functioning.
The ideal of rational, predictable functioning in a mainstream manner is not collegial but managerial.64 Gunther believed that in order to have a different kind of institute, 'we'd better learn from our past experience and design a structure that supports and reflects our new aims. Specifically, we'd better learn how to function with a more collegial-democratic structure'.65
The Psychoanalytic Education Council consisted of the director and 17 other members who were, mostly, reelected consistently and on an indefinite basis. George Moraitis recalled that the nominations were made by George Pollock and very seldom would a new member be elected to the Council. 'I was never quite sure how this actually occurred, but there were no formalities maintained in the process of voting and counting the votes. Of course, this was not a democratic organisation'.
Moraitis recalled that most of the Psychoanalytic Education Council meetings he attended were spent with Pollock making reports, often about issues that had very little to do with the institute. Nevertheless, once in a while, an issue would come up which, according to Moraitis,
would be very quickly squashed and attention redirected. If there was any conflict, George would think of nominating or appointing a committee to explore the issue. By the time the committee reported it was too late to do anything. In the 1970s, a committee was appointed to re-evaluate the curriculum and the whole training program. That committee came up with some very interesting suggestions about how to proceed, among which was the appointment of preceptors to follow the candidates' growth and to co-ordinate the educational development of each individual. The committee report was submitted in the 1970s and was and then tabled, and did not finally come up until twelve years later. Somebody at the meeting said that the United States mail is really much slower than one would have thought. It's really a sign of how things were dealt with and how quietly and subtly people were ignored, put aside, not really given attention to and proper audience. Ironically, when the issue was brought to his attention finally, a new committee was appointed to bring up to date the results of the old one. This was done quickly and I was a member of that second committee. Then the issue was tabled once more because it 'was not timely to act on'. When I first joined the committee, along with another analyst, I started asking some questions which people didn't use to ask. We were considered enormously brave for being able to simply inquire rather than simply avoid asking questions.66
On the 24th floor of the CPsaI and in the Conference Room, luncheon was served for the selected few who were close to the administration. The lunch had a long tradition from when Alexander specifically reserved it for the staff of the CPsaI. Council members were invited, although the majority of them would not attend lunch. Moraitis commented, 'Eating there was considered a distinction, as an indication of being a member of the inner group which was taken very seriously by some of the people who were close to Pollock'.67
Another part of the system of rewards concerned training analyst status and the assignment of candidates to training analysts. Because the power structure of the CPsaI was located in the board, the director and the staff or council rather than being vested in an Education Committee which running the CPsaI, training analyst status assumed secondary importance in Chicago. Since training analyst status unlike in most institutes carried little power, it was not too difficult to achieve training analyst status in Chicago. Not long after Pollock's reign came to an end most training analysts were not analysing any candidates while the others generally were each analysing one or two candidates. In 1990 there were 58 active (and 31 inactive) teaching and training analysts in the institute in a faculty of 86.68 George Moraitis commented that this was 'an amazingly high number of training analysts for any institute, and this was because George Pollock granted that title very generously unless there was something very definitely wrong with the individual and clear evidence why he should not get the title. Of course, the title did not mean that the training analyst would be asked to do very much or assume any responsibility. So it was simply an honorary degree which helped the analyst's self esteem, his self image and the image maybe on a national level, but locally it had very little meaning'.69
Since there was no cost for handing out the rewards of training analyst status, this approach provided clear advantages for the leadership. Reward made the recipients happy as well as hungry for the opportunity to employ their status within the system.
By itself their newly awarded status conferred no power, only entrance into the pool of training analysts who could be assigned candidates by the leadership. The allocation of candidates and positions (increasingly scarce relative to demand) was in the gift of the director or a committee under his control. Training analysts were cemented into the system since those deciding who among the training analysts actually received training cases were powerful.
Arnold Goldberg was the major opponent of Pollock throughout but he had no power in the council. Any effective action against Pollock would have needed to come from his lieutenants, which was never a real possibility.70
A powerful figure in the APsaA and internationally, Heinz Kohut was also a charismatic figure in Chicago. He had always been a good source of referrals and his classes at the institute were very popular with candidates. George Pollock praised him for his encouragement of younger people' in his obituary.71 Kohut helped Pollock as he had others in the institute and Pollock did not cast Kohut out when he developed his new ideas: 'We supported Heinz's research because it was worthy of support, not necessarily because it was something which we agreed with in all details'.72 Kohut received considerable contributions towards his research in self psychology from Pollock. However, another interpretation might be that it was a political accommodation where Pollock tried to ensure that Kohut would not rock the boat too much at the institute.73 The CPsaI did not support Kohut when he was developing his ideas but during a much later period.
Pollock reacted strongly to possible opposition. When Kohut mooted the idea of revising the curriculum and including an informal postgraduate course in self psychology within the institute, Pollock reacted strongly since the suggestion could be construed as an institute within an institute which would have challenged Pollock's control. After an intensive telephone campaign against them, Kohut and fellow self psychologist, Arnold Goldberg, were not reelected to the Council in 1978.74 As Goldberg told me in 1981, 'Every time we try to do any kind of study with selection, with progression, with curriculum, etc. they get very frightened, they get very angry and they put the kibosh on. You've just got to leave them alone'.75 Analysts who were not compliant were excluded. One analyst, George Klumpner, was removed from committees and dumped when he stood again for the council after he asked to see the institute budget.76 According to John Gedo, Pollock thus 'demonstrated that if you took certain liberties, he had the power to clip your wings. Therefore people ceased to challenge him. It no longer looked like a Central European system-it looked like an American university on the surface'.77 (Pollock changed the title of 'director' to 'president' to bring it more in line with universities). Arnold Goldberg told me in 1981, 'Don't think for a moment that it's anything but a trade school. It's like automechanics'.78
The research culture shifted considerably from being centred in the institute when Alexander was the major intellectual leader and director. In the Pollock era the director was by no means a major intellectual presence and the institute became a shell. Much of the intellectual work took place outside the formal organisation of the institute, such as by John Gedo, Merton Gill and the self psychologists who became effectively split off.79 The group of self psychologists which included Kohut, Goldberg, the Tolpins, Michael Basch and Ernest Wolf was, in Arnold Goldberg's view, emotionally and intellectually clearly split off.80
The institute had moved from charisma to a Chicago form of bureaucracy.81 The combination of boosterism and hustling mixed with conflicts of interest prevailed. It fitted Nelson Algren's description of Chicago 'living 'like a drunken El-rider who cannot remember where he got on nor at what station he wants to get off. The sound of wheels moving below satisfies him that he is making great progress'.82
The board appointed Pollock to a second five year term from 1976, and then again (overriding the two term limit) in 1980 for an additional five year term from 1981. Yet again, Pollock was selected for an additional three-year term (effective July 1, 1986) on December 13, 1985 through a search committee formed by Lou Shapiro and Nathan Schlesinger. Again, this was beyond the constitution.83
The Board of Trustees
Since the ultimate fiduciary and organisational power of the institute was vested in a lay Board of Trustees of around 40 members that owned the charter the role of the board is a vital element in the story. Consisting of a variety of people, many wealthy and socially prominent, they were able to raise money for many institute functions.84
Members of the board often were in analysis with CPsaI leaders, especially the director. Since the director selected the members of the lay Board of Trustees-a number of the director's patients were members-and the Board of Trustees picked the director.85 While most of the board members were barely involved, its small Executive Committee was more central. Most members of this committee were close to Pollock, or had been or were in analysis with him. This made the supervisory aspect of the Executive Committee a difficult and possibly conflicted one, resulting in Pollock having a virtually free hand.86 As Goldberg put it, Pollock 'played them like a fiddle'.87 Gedo saw the board as 'an instrument in the hands of the director. If there should be a clash with the faculty, it's a weapon in his hands'.88 Yet Pollock's ability to prevail included, as Charles Kligerman put it, many 'tangles' with the board, as.89
With an annual institute budget of almost two million dollars under Pollock, much emphasis needed to be on soliciting money by the lay board who had little or no knowledge of psychoanalysis.90 Board members never had a passion for core educational issues of interest to the analysts but emphasised the orientation toward community service, public relations, and spreading influence.91 As Moraitis observed, the notion that it was desirable to accept money from patients was so widespread among faculty members and administrators that an ethic was established at the CPsaI that 'it is all right to accept large sums of money from patients if they are given for the promotion of psychoanalysis. As a result of that ethic, the CPsaI became the richest institute in the country. Overall, it was accepted as a sort of modus operandi, it was within the boundaries of analytic behaviour'. The consequences of what Moraitis termed 'a commercialisation of psychoanalysis' was the reinforcement of a structure that took the emphasis away from intellectual pursuits towards fund raising, promotion campaigns, handling the media, and budget considerations. The price was too high.92
Waiting for the fall
However, two related sets of circumstances entered the picture. By the mid-1980s, as in other parts of the country, psychoanalysis in Chicago was going into steep decline with rapidly diminishing numbers of candidates and referrals. Pollock conceded that the future for psychoanalysis was bleak.93 As George Moraitis commented, 'A diffuse pessimism was spread all over the CPsaI about its future and the future of the profession in Chicago'.94 With a shrinking institute and most of the sinecures already allotted to those who had held the positions for many years, the number of rewards left to hand out shrivelled. Since nobody was disqualified, this left a large number of institute members with no rewards and nothing much to do. The faculty-student ratio was very unbalanced with the number of applications down and a large faculty of 80, including 60 training analysts.95 The number of training analysts had doubled since Pollock became director.96 The patronage system, based on the assumption that it would keep expanding, stopped working when it became overextended. Finally, with no more room for people coming up from below, the more restricted patronage bred further resentment and less allegiance to Pollock.97 Kligerman recalled Pollock becoming 'less and less popular', getting 'more estranged from people who he might have depended on'.98 Resentment grew geometrically as the gravy train had even less gravy to dispense to anyone.99 Even the staff lunches were cancelled for lack of funds.100
The other circumstance related directly to Pollock as he withdrew much of his energy, time and attention from the CPsaI. A major heart attack and heart surgery took him away from the CPsaI for some time. Pollock's involvement with the affairs of the American Psychiatric Association (treasurer 1980-86 and president 1987-88) increasingly took time away from institute matters.101 Moraitis recalled that Pollock 'felt he was in a very small pond and he was too big a fish to stay in it. I know that he was very unhappy settling for the directorship of the CPsaI'. He announced that he had entered into negotiations with Northwestern University where he was a professor to become Research Director in psychiatry and made it known that he was looking for more lucrative and powerful jobs elsewhere.102
With Pollock's attention and interest were obviously on other things, Moraitis remembered that the institute felt a sense of abandonment and alienation by a director who was viewed as irreplaceable. Moraitis considered this to be part of an 'idealised image', idealised in that Pollock 'was considered as the one and only who could unite the institute and could maintain its cohesiveness and structure'.103 Pollock's pessimism and withdrawal, Moraitis believed, brought about 'a sense of vacuum or void in leadership. The leader was departing. There was no plan for succession'.104
Pollock was clearly aware of the problems and dangers of long-term appointments to the directorship when he introduced amendments to the regulations instituting a limit of two five year terms in 1971. He was asked then if ten years was enough. Charles Kligerman recalled Pollock's reply: if he couldn't get what he wanted accomplished in ten years he did not deserve it. 'But as time went on he began to have second thoughts about that', Kligerman noted.105 These regulations were suspended so that Pollock could be appointed for a third term from 1981. Kligerman, a member of the search committee for the director at that time, recalled that 'we couldn't find anybody who we thought could be a suitable director'. The search committee decided against inviting Arnold Goldberg to be director and saw no other alternative than giving Pollock a third term, Kligerman recalled. Later Kligerman said that giving Pollock a third term 'was a huge mistake'. The committee recommended that the search should begin earlier next time so that there would be time to develop a new leader. 'Nobody demurred very much' from the decision to reappoint Pollock.106 There was really no contest with Pollock. The board on which Pollock had immense influence changed the bylaws. Nobody would have challenged Pollock for the position of director given Pollock's power and the sense of Pollock as irreplaceable.107
The CPsaI colluded with Pollock by reappointing him. In a 1992 interview Charles Kligerman maintained, 'The sad thing is that although it was an unhealthy arrangement, it did give the institute a certain prestige that it has lost since then. Its power and prestige has declined in the city. This was one of the powerful institutes in the world'.108
Part of the problem was the extent to which Pollock seemed to identify himself with the institute implying that his interests and the institute's interests necessarily coincided. The position he occupied and the effectiveness with which he exercised his power nurtured such an illusion. Yet, the apparent split between his own good and that of the institute ended his career at the institute and blemished his reputation within psychoanalysis.
The fall
In March 1988 it was discovered that the estranged son of an expatient was suing George Pollock for exploiting the patient and gaining financial advantage from her, thus violating psychiatric and psychoanalytic ethics. The son held that Pollock had profited from his mother's will at his expense. The details of the suit began to appear in the press in May.109 Details began to be revealed of the legal contest over the $5 million estate of Anne Lederer, a wealthy widow, who was a board member and Pollock's patient. Anne Lederer had died in 1984 at the age of 78 and the trial was set for September 22, 1988. She had inherited a sizeable amount of money from her father who was with Sears Roebuck and Co., and her husband had been a prosperous Chicago ear, nose and throat specialist. In the Cook County Probate Court Lederer's only child, Francis, accused Pollock of exploiting for selfish gain the fourteen year psychiatric relationship with Lederer. Pollock was accused of exercising 'undue influence' over his mother from when she began treatment with Pollock in 1969 until she died. She was treated for depression five times a week and Pollock continued to prescribe medication until 1983, according to court records.
Anne Lederer left $200,000 to her son and several thousand dollars to two grandchildren. But she left most of her estate of around $5 million to the Anne P. Lederer Research Institute founded by her in 1980 to promote psychiatric research. Francis Lederer alleged that the establishment of the institute was mainly meant to financially benefit Pollock since Pollock was supposed to serve as the director of this institute at a substantial salary. Pre-trial proceedings revealed that the trust that had been set up for Pollock yielded him and his family $80,000 a year together with other money for his depression research.110
In sworn pre-trial testimony witnesses stated that Anne Lederer treated Pollock as a replacement for her husband who died in 1973. Pollock was said to have advised her about much of her life, including eating, domicile and which attorneys should revise her will, as well as giving her gifts and flowers and phoning her most days.
Pollock`s attorneys maintained that Anne Lederer was just following a family tradition when she left most of her estate to charity. Their expert witness, a psychiatrist at Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke`s Medical Center, claimed that Anne Lederer was not under undue influence. Through his attorneys, Pollock claimed the charges were a distorted, twisted exercise in fiction.111
As an expert on mourning, George Pollock had a special interest and expertise in treating elderly patients.112 Pollock had not treated Anne Lederer analytically but rather by making the institute her home. She spent a good deal of time working in the library to which she had donated a sizeable amount of money. She was treated as part of the family at the CPsaI and clearly profited from it. Lederer's fund was well-known for its support of many institute activities. One of Pollock's supporters discovered the suit through his son, a Chicago attorney, who noticed the suit against Pollock about the will in The Law Bulletin. He asked his son to follow the legal manoeuvres and told selected colleagues about the scandal. Gedo commented that this demonstrated that the system was at breaking point since someone who benefited so much from the system was 'ready to pounce on Pollock if he laid himself open in any way. In a sense, it was a coincidence that what broke it was this scandal. If it hadn't been this, something else would soon have come up'. Some APsaA leaders took private delight in these developments. 'Everybody was just waiting for the man to fall', Gedo recalled.
In March 1988 analysts who knew approached a Board of Trustees official and suggested asking Pollock to stay on the sidelines until the issue was resolved. The trustee went to Toronto where Pollock was attending a conference of the American Psychiatric Association, and solicited his agreement to the plan.
Pollock told individual faculty members that his personal business was none of theirs, and that he had done nothing wrong. When the council confronted Pollock about the issue of the trusts, emotion ran high. When Pollock turned up with his lawyer, the council realised that they were dealing with a legal issue and not a collegial discussion.
In his opening statement to the council Pollock reportedly argued that his actions were not at variance with what Freud did at different times in his life. In no way could he be held responsible for unethical conduct given the fact that the founder of psychoanalysis had acted similarly. He wondered whether the accusations represented the countertransference of some faculty members. George Moraitis remembered raising the possibility that
given the reaction of the faculty and the objections to that, that maybe he would like to return the money or make some gesture in that respect and settle the issue that way. I got so emotional during the meeting that I walked out of it because I felt I couldn't control myself and was very upset about it. And then I came back. Obviously, the faculty was not satisfied with George's responses and from then on the process began of trying to persuade George to step down from his position.
Soon after the confrontation Moraitis and Pollock attended an event where they signed copies of a book they co-edited. Moraitis recalled that Pollock would not speak to or look at him: 'The lines had been drawn, the war had been declared. It has been the same ever since'.
Moraitis recalled a very long and arduous process of trying to decide how to proceed. The council met frequently, always in executive session where no records were kept. At some point there was a vote of the faculty at large to request Pollock to step down which was transmitted to Pollock by a delegation from the faculty.113
Kligerman suggested to the group that Pollock should be asked to resign because of loss of confidence in him. During the process the faculty was not immediately informed of all the thinking and negotiations by the council which handled the situation semi-secretly allegedly because of the threat of lawsuit from Pollock.114
As a friend, Charles Kligerman suggested privately to Pollock that he step aside on leave of absence from his position that was to terminate in 15 months. Pollock refused on the grounds that since he had done nothing wrong, this was tantamount to an admission of guilt. Pollock did not accept Kligerman's justification that if there were a question about a chairman of a corporation, there was nothing wrong with taking a leave of absence without prejudice while the issues were resolved.115 Nonetheless, according to Gilda Buchbinder, head of the Board of Trustees, Pollock decided to take leave 'to prepare for the trial of the lawsuit and to address matters raised by news releases about that case'. Henry Seidenberg, vice president of the CPsaI, she said would assume Pollock's presidential duties during his absence.116 Pollock had previously designated Seidenberg as dean of education to be acting director when he was away.117 Seidenberg was made acting director in May 1988.
The court proceedings ended with the declaration of a mistrial followed by an undisclosed settlement.118
The council was instrumental in dealing with the crisis and took the management of the institute upon itself. Since the council was still viewed as the seat of Pollock's power while the faculty was less blessed by Pollock, the faculty needed to be consulted. While a struggle ensued about succession and reorganisation, there was, Moraitis recalled, 'a remarkable consensus' about the situation surrounding Pollock.119
During this period some members argued that instead of forcing Pollock to resign, he should have been suspended, and that a dialogue should have been established about why all this had happened, what the affair represented in the institute's structure and whether it represented a basic defect in the CPsaI? Faculty member Arnold Tobin remembered,
Only two or three people spoke up and said, How was the group at fault, how did we fail him as well as he fail us? I must say there was a total uninterest in that kind of discussion. It didn't take place. It isn't going to take place and there is very little interest-for a group of people that are interested in psychology we have a remarkable lack of interest in group psychology and how we relate as individuals to the group.120
The faculty including Pollock's most trusted supporters unanimously passed a motion of no confidence. The vote asked Pollock to take a leave of absence. After three five-year terms and the half of a new three year term, When Pollock took leave of absence, he was at once hired at Northwestern University.
The Chicago Psychoanalytic Society, with democrats George Klumpner as 1987-88 president and George Moraitis as its 1988-89 president, decided to instigate its own investigation. The society saw it as part of its role since articles appeared in the press about the institute.121 The society finally decided not to pursue its investigations in Chicago and to refer the issues to the APsaA which, after long deliberations, decided to do nothing about the matter.122
Many board members were very sympathetic to Pollock. As Pollock's ex-analysands a number retained close ties with him. Moraitis recalled, 'They didn't want to let him go-they felt he was betrayed and railroaded and that he should fight back. So there was a strong opposition to his leaving and a strong opposition to the faculty's behaviour. There were some very powerful feelings operating from both sides'.123
When the council voted 59 to 0 to ask Pollock to resign from the institute Barrie Richmond recalled that 'there was not one person in that room who did not feel in some way indebted to George'.124 Although Pollock had been helpful and treated some analysts well, he had lost his power to call in favours. While Pollock was never expelled from the group, 'he is a man without a country as far as we are concerned', Kligerman contended.125
However, Pollock clearly felt wronged by the institute, consistently maintaining that his innocence on all accounts. It is understandable why he distanced himself from the CPsaI since they were so critical of his actions. The issues should not be reduced to personalities as the whole train of events needs to be seen in the context that the position of director until Pollock was structured as that of a powerful and dominant boss with an undesirable level of personal authority.
The Reorganization
A strong reaction set in after Pollock left. When the council considered how to proceed, the necessity for reorganisation became evident. Moraitis recalled several stormy revolutionary meetings 'characterised by very sharp attacks against those who maintained positions for a long time under George's umbrella. These were the Chairmen of Committees who had maintained their jobs for a very long time and teachers of courses who had been teaching them for decades'.126
The energy of the CPsaI was therefore devoted to its reorganisation along ultra-democratic lines. None of the accoutrements of the Pollock regime was spared as 'power to the people' became the order over the following years. There was not only glasnost but also perastroika.. An association of equal colleagues replaced the hierarchy. Checks and balances were introduced to ensure that nobody could stack committees or take unfair advantage. An elected Committee on Committees instead of the director decided the chairs and membership of committees.127 That was the downside. In Gedo's view this was 'the finest single example of "democracy run riot"-a democracy where personal popularity is what is important'. It became 'a fantastically cumbersome system'.128 The new regulations listed the functions of directors but not their powers. The structure became increasingly complicated militating against work being done effectively.
However, the 1991 APsaA site visitors were full of praise for the Committee on Committees they thought to be 'the finest example of the changes brought about by the Reorganization'. They regarded the tensions as part of an evolving process and admired the way the Psychoanalytic Education Council worked. They observed a meeting in which: 'The good-natured, warm tone of the meeting did not restrain the straight direct manner in which the councilors talk to each other and express their points of view. What a change this must be!' The committee congratulated the institute 'on the achievement this represents for the Reorganization-to replace an over-centralized, top-heavy monarchical system and move to a democratic system with balance of powers in so short a time is remarkable'.129
The revolution involved a major transfer of power over to the faculty, although the Board of Trustees remained. Nevertheless, associations with Pollock tainted members of the board. The board became less important since psychoanalysis was no longer popular and did not command as much fund-raising potential. Income from the annual institute fund-raising benefit and from contributions from the board was in decline. In dollar terms, income from grants and contributions was one third of what is was a decade before, not even allowing for considerable inflation over that period.130 However, as Gedo noted, the members 'did not want to cut themselves off from the Board of Trustees partly because of the fantasy of social cachet, and partly because they did not realize how little money the Board of Trustees actually contributed. It gave them a sense of security'.131 This took place in the climate of the general decline of the profession.132
Pollock was killed in effigy many times over in an atmosphere in which justice being seen to be done became at least as important as its being done. As the Pollock regime was about power and not ideas the revolution reacted to abuses of power without changing the climate of ideas. In a 1992 interview, Michael Basch maintained that the revolution was only against power, not against ideas. 'They are still fighting the institute after Pollock left. They are still fighting the last war. They are dealing with everyone as if each director were going to be like George Pollock'.133
Since Pollock did not resign but took leave of absence in 1988, his term needed to be completed before a new director was appointed. Once the Committee on Committees was instituted, energies became focused on the process of selecting a new director whose term was to begin after Pollock's term officially expired in June 1989. A somewhat acrimonious political campaign, unheard of in the institute, was waged while tensions between board and faculty ensued where the board rejected the faculty's right to select the director.134
Finally, a compromise was reached and Arnold Goldberg, Pollock's longest standing opponent and a self psychologist, was elected for a three year term in October 1989. He was generally regarded as a fair and competent administrator.135 Because of the cumbersome new structures, Goldberg often found it difficult to get tasks done. Goldberg recalled,
When I took over as director, we had a deficit that would have closed the organisation. We would have had to literally have closed in four years. I was left with a potential deficit of $300,000 a year. I did many things which I felt saved the organisation from that fate. My feeling was that I bent over backwards to be democratic. But I also had the feeling that certain things had to be done, one, that did not lend themselves to referendum, and, two, that were not relevant to 'Shall we all vote on whether I can rent this office and give a decorating allowance to the person?', something we have never done before.136
Considerable tensions developed between the director and the membership, some of which related to personality (many did not like his harsh and direct manner, others found him dictatorial) and some related to structural issues.137
Tom Pappadis followed Goldberg as director. In the opinion of George Moraitis the Pappadis administration (1992-98) emphasised two things: 'constant consensus, and the need to maintain a balanced budget and good physical surroundings'.138 Pappadis successfully managed the move of the institute from a mildly dilapidated building to a more expensive, salubrious, upmarket one. The board became still less important and the institute survived because of tuition, contributions and dues.139 There has been concern on the board about the past practice of having board members as patients of faculty, especially of the director.140 During this period, the CPsaI introduced a master's degree program in psychoanalysis together with the University of Chicago.
Elected in 1998, the current director is Jerry Winer, an open-minded analyst and full professor of psychiatry at the University of Illinois Winer has serious educational and intellectual interests as well as administrative expertise. The author of 60 articles and reviews, he has edited the Chicago Annual of Psychoanalysis over the past seven years, is a member of a number of APsaA committees and is chair of the International Psychoanalytic Association's Ethics Committee. Winer recognises that psychoanalysis in Chicago was 'in a time of eclipse' that mandated 'fresh approaches' to return to a place of prestige, leadership, and influence in this city and beyond'. He proposes furthering relationships with universities in joint projects, pursue funding from new spheres, broaden the range and audience of the research seminars, and increase the visibility of the institute in Chicago.141 Winer is the first director of the CPsaA to be a full time academic.142
What were the fruits of the Reorganization? While the CPsaI moved to a less divisive, far more congenial democratic atmosphere, the number of candidates remained small and intellectual activity did not increase with more democracy.143 As Arnold Goldberg put it,
To say that democracy is the best flower for creativity, we know this is not the case. The best we know is argument is the best ground for new ideas to come about. Struggling, argument, fighting over issues. What has happened with this institute with democracy is that they reread it as egalitarianism. Egalitarianism means that we don't disagree, we have to be nice guys. That's the tragedy.144
Apart from John Gedo's work and the continued developments among the self psychologists, there has been little intellectual activity.
The self psychologists have thrived with better practices than others have but they have been effectively split off from the institute for two decades. The 1997 annual conference of self psychology held in Chicago was sold out with 700 registrants.145
Organisationally, the pyramidal structure of the CPsaI was replaced by a system where nobody has any control, where everybody complains about being powerless. After Pollock, members were not ready for another figure who did not consult and wielded power strongly. The aftermath of the Pollock regime degenerated into what Moraitis termed a 'circle of impotence' with a 'vicious cycle' where the power to effect changes is stymied by an unwieldy committee structure involving excessive oversight.146
The institute needs downsizing as the organisation is, as Gedo put it, 'absurdly overblown for the number of candidates we can expect. It's a banana republic, full of generals without troops. So we have to shrink, we have to concentrate on psychoanalytic matters, scholarly matters, give up these imperialistic ambitions'.147 In 1994 there were 57 candidates and 90 faculty.148 Candidates came mainly from the wider pool of social workers and psychologists who were accepted into APsaA institutes after the psychologists' lawsuit, but even so in 1996 there were three new candidates and no class was held.149 Training analyst status has remained an empty space since there are so few candidates. However, the faculty has been increased, as have the assessments on faculty members. John Gedo likened this income producing device as akin to the old European regimes selling patents of nobility. The spirit had not changed despite the revolution.150 In Gedo's view, insofar as the Pappadis administration showed the awareness that something needed to change, it tried to turn the clock back to the days of imperial glory, and tried to accomplish this by the usual administrative machinations. Currently, this means increasing enrolments by making the CPsaI more 'user-friendly', with the implication that most would be accepted and few requirements would be enforced. According to Gedo, the present tensions are between the minority who want to upgrade the intellectual level and the apparachiks who ensure that this will not happen.151 As Arnold Goldberg told his contemporaries, 'we lived through the rise and decline of the science. The only thing that will save us is the recrudescence of intellectual thought'.152 Nonetheless, there is more tolerance; as folksinger Judy Collins might have put it in her concert benefit for the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society, everybody listens to 'Both sides now'.153
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1 N. Algren, Chicago: city on the make, McGraw Hill, New York, 1963, p. 62. Carl Sandburg was the 'white-haired poet' who called Chicago the 'city of big shoulders' in his poem, 'Chicago'.
2 Charles Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 17, 1981.
3 R. Grinker Sr., 'Identity or regression in American psychoanalysis?', Arch. Gen. Psychiatry, 12, 1965: 113-125; 'The history of psychoanalysis in Chicago: 1911-1975', Annual of Psychoanalysis Vol. XXIII (Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis), The Analytic Press, Hillsdale NJ, 1995, pp. 155-95 (original typescript, 1975).
4 R. Grinker Sr., 'The history of psychoanalysis in Chicago: 1911-1975', p. 175; Kavka, 'Fifty years of psychoanalysis in Chicago: a historical perspective', in G. Pollock & J. Gedo, eds., Psychoanalysis: the vital issues: Volume II, International Universities Press, New York, 1984, p. 469.
5 Pollock, 'The Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis from 1932 to the present', in Quen, J. and E. Carlson, eds., American psychoanalysis: origins and development, Brunner/Mazel, New York, 1978, p. 114; 'The presence of the past', The Annual of Psychoanalysis, XI, 1983, p. 12.
6 Pollock, 'The presence of the past', The Annual of Psychoanalysis, XI, 1983, pp. 15, 19.
7 The institute's 1932 statement of purpose laid great emphasis on research outside private practice and its achievement through funding from external sources. (See statement excerpted in Pollock, 'The presence of the past', The Annual of Psychoanalysis, XI, 1983, pp. 8-10).
8 Pollock, 'The presence of the past', p. 19. As well as Alexander and Horney the staff included Thomas French, Helen McLean, Catherine Bacon, Lionel Blitzsten and Karl Menninger (Pollock, 'The presence of the past', p. 11). Karl Menninger was the first to receive a certificate of training as a psychoanalyst from the CPsaI. His brother William also trained there.
9 Pollock, 'The presence of the past', p. 11.
10 'Dialogue vs. drugs: psychiatry's mood swings between the lab and couch', The Chicago Tribune, May 10, 1987
11 John Gedo, personal communication, December 15, 1997; Pollock, 'The presence of the past'; interview with David Slight, Chicago, June 12, 1984.
12 B. Lewin and H. Ross, Psychoanalytic education in the United States, Norton, New York, 1960, p. 15.
13 Kligerman interview, Chicago, July 1, 1992. Obituary: Dr Charles Kligerman, Chicago Tribune, April 17, 1996.
14 Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 17, 1981.
15 Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 17, 1981.
16 Charles Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 17, 1981.
17 John Gedo, personal communication, December 10, 1997.
18 Kligerman interview, Chicago, July 1, 1992.
19 John Gedo interview, Chicago, June 29, 1992.
20 Charles Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
21 Grinker, 'The history of psychoanalysis in Chicago: 1911-1975', p. 168. However, Alexander's unorthodoxy about role-playing and the corrective emotional experience paled in comparison with his daughter, Lilla van Saher, who became a consort of Jerzy Kosinski, and was hostess both to a modish New York literary salon, and allegedly to men whom she provided with sexual 'punishment' in her work as a dominatrix! See J. Sloan, Jerzy Kosinski: a biography, Penguin Books, New York, 1996, pp. 182-83.
22 Roy Grinker Sr. Interview, Chicago, June 26, 1981.
23 Kavka, 'Fifty years of psychoanalysis in Chicago: a historical perspective', p. 475.
24 See S. Brent, The seven stairs, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1962, Ch. 6.
25 D. Kirsner, 'Self-psychology and the psychoanalytic movement: an interview with Dr Heinz Kohut', Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 5, 3, 1982, p. 495.
26 Kohut told John Gedo that he was the person who actually devised the five year curriculum (Gedo interview, Chicago, October 5, 1996.
27 Charles Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
28 Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
29 Gedo interview, Chicago, October 4, 1996; interview with M. Barrie Richmond, Chicago, October 4, 1996.
30 Gedo interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
31 Gedo interview, Chicago, October 4, 1996
32 John Gedo, Spleen and nostalgia: a life and work in psychoanalysis, Jason Aronson, New York, 1997, pp. 46-49.
33 Gedo, Spleen and nostalgia, pp. 57-59.
34 A number of institutes have been sponsored by the Chicago Institute. Topeka and Detroit were earlier daughters of the Chicago Institute, Cincinnati was of the same vintage as St Louis and Denver, and Minnesota and Wisconsin are currently struggling to be born (John Gedo, personal communication, December 10, 1997).
35 Pollock, 'The presence of the past', pp. 21-2.
36 Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994; Gedo interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
37 Pollock, 'The presence of the past', p. 22.
38 Gedo interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994; Gedo, 1997, p. 42. Pollock was the protagonist in a research project begun by Franz Alexander on 'psychosomatic specificity', the idea that a specific conflict precipitated the onset of a specific somatic illness such asthma, ulcerative colitis and peptic ulcer. This project attracted the powerful elite of the CPsaI who worked hard to validate Alexander's hypotheses. The project backfired, never proving the hypotheses and was little discussed in Chicago. Other projects such as the Barr-Harris research on bereavement and mourning which was close to Pollock's heart, were not very successful while many other individual projects were not supported by the institute (George Moraitis, personal communication, December 1990; G. Pollock and M. Pilot, 'Psychosomatic specificity hypothesis testing', Bull. Menninger Clin., 34, 1970:85-88; G. Pollock, 'The psychosomatic specificity concept: evolution, re-evaluation'. Annual Psychoanal., 5, 1977:141-168).
39 John Gedo, personal communication, December 10, 1997. When Gedo discussed his concerns about Pollock being appointed with Heinz Kohut, then a powerful figure in Chicago and American psychoanalysis, Heinz Kohut, then a powerful figure in Chicago and American psychoanalysis, was puzzled by Gedo's concerns about Pollock's being appointed. He declined Gedo's suggestion that Kohut would be the only effective block to Pollock because he felt the job would have interfered with his intellectual work. Kohut felt his prestige would be able to keep any director in line. (Gedo interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994; Gedo, Spleen and nostalgia, pp. 104-5.
40 Kligerman interview, June 30, 1994.
41 Gedo interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994. Gedo wrote, 'I still believe that, if he had devoted himself wholeheartedly to scientific issue within psychoanalysis, he could have made a truly major contribution to the field, But he could never resist the lure of empire building', Spleen and nostalgia, pp. 41-42.
42 R. Grinker Sr., 'The history of psychoanalysis in Chicago: 1911-1975', Annual of Psychoanalysis Vol. XXIII (Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis), The Analytic Press, Hillsdale NJ, 1995, pp. 155-95.
43 Kligerman interviews, Chicago, June 17, 1981 and June 30, 1994; Pollock, 'The Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis from 1932 to the present', p. 118.
44 Gedo interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
45 Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
46 The budget was $62,000 in 1933-34, $311,000 in 1960-61, and $760,000 in 1976-77. (Pollock, 1978, pp. 118-19; 1983, pp. 22-27). By comparison the Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Institute, no smaller than Chicago in terms of analytic candidates, had a budget of $75,000 while PINE, one of the smallest institutes, started with a budget of about $3,000 in 1976 (John Gedo, personal communication, December 10, 1997).
47 Wallerstein interview, San Francisco, June 26, 1987.
48 Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
49 Holzman interview, Cambridge, April 28, 1981.
50 Wallerstein interview, San Francisco, June 26, 1987.
51 Sol Altschul interview, Chicago, June 8, 1981.
52 Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 17, 1981
53 It may be objected that a counterexample may have been the BPSI-PINE split but among other things the level of the BPSI's assets was considerably smaller, there was no real distribution of grants, etc.
54 Grinker, 'The history of psychoanalysis in Chicago: 1911-1975'.
55 H. Marcuse, 'Repressive tolerance' (1965), in R. Wolf, B. Moore Jr. & H. Marcuse, A critique of pure tolerance, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, pp. 81-117.
56 Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 30. 1994.
57 It struck me that this was a somewhat similar situation to the one described to me by Elliott Jaques who worked as Research Professor of Management Science at George Washington University. George Washington University, founded in 1828, was defined as consisting of the 36 original members appointed by the US president at the time. That body was in perpetual renewal. The university is made up of the original 36 and as one disappeared of whoever then got elected. 'It's an infinitely self-perpetuating body. That is the university-plus somebody called the president of the university who is appointed by the Trustees and is ex officio a member of the Board of Trustees. The Constitution provides for nobody else-no employees of the university and no teaching staff of the university are to be members of the board. In addition, no issues can be put on the board other than by board members on their own behalf or by the president in terms of the teaching staff and so on none of whom are allowed to put anything on the board agenda other than putting it through the president who decides whether it goes on the agenda or not. The University also has a Senate and guess who the Chairman of the Senate is! The president. So you have the president who is ex officio on the board, he is the Chairman of the teaching staff Senate, and everything has to go through the Senate. They then complain that the president behaves like a monarch. That's supposed to be a personality characteristic, he's an autocratic, authoritarian monarch. What they haven't noticed is that every president has behaved in that way. It has nothing to do with his personality or anything else, it is what the role calls for. He is in a monarchical position. And, therefore, you can predict a lot of behaviours in the University' (Jaques interview, Melbourne, November 17, 1990).
58 Gedo interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
59 George Moraitis interview, Chicago, July 4, 1992.
60 Gunther interview, Chicago, June 30, 1992.
61 M. Gunther, 'Cassandra papers, Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis: Statistical analyses of teaching assignments and courses, 1975-1988', unpublished. December, 1988.
62 M. Gunther, 'Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis: Statistical analyses of teaching assignments and courses, 1975-1988', unpublished, December, 1988.
63 Moraitis interview, Chicago, August 14, 1984.
64 See O. Kernberg, 'Institutional problems of psychoanalytic education', J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn., 34, 4, 1986: 799-834.
65 Gunther, 'Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis: Statistical analyses of teaching assignments and courses, 1975-1988', December, 1988.
66 Moraitis, personal communication, September 30, 1990.
67 Moraitis, personal communication, September 30, 1990.
68 Since only one appointment had been made in the previous year, this figure was a correct representation of the number of training analysts under Pollock (American Psychoanalytic Association, 1991). There were 80 candidates at the time ('Psychoanalysis benefit on edge, but never mind', The Chicago Tribune, June 9, 1989)
69 George Moraitis, personal communication, September 30, 1990. As John Gedo observed, 'In Chicago being a training analyst does not amount to much as they are as plentiful as blackberries, not being a training analyst is absolutely ruinous' (Gedo, Spleen and nostalgia, p. 79). When there was a such a surplus of training analysts, according to Gedo, 'unofficial distinctions inevitably develop among them. There are those who have the title in name only, because the Institute never refers any candidates to them. There are others who might get one or two referrals in a lifetime, crumbs from the table of patronage, so to speak. Then there are the insiders who get the largest number of referrals, and almost all the candidates who look likely they might make an uncomplicated analytic course. (Needless to say, this group used to include the current director, the dean, and their kitchen cabinet)' (Ibid, pp. 86-87). See Kohut's comparable view in a 1963 letter to Gerhart Piers published in G. Cocks, The curve of life: correspondence of Heinz Kohut 1923-1981, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, p. 90.
70 Gedo interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
71 Pollock, 'Heinz Kohut: 1913-1981'. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, LI, pp. 284-85.
72 Ibid., p. 283.
73 George Moraitis, personal communication, December 1990.
74 Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994; Gedo interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994; Kohut to Lotte Köhler, June 1978 in Cocks (ed.), 1994, pp. 368-71. Although he was later reelected to Council, Kohut dated the end of his sense of loyalty to the CPsaI from this event (see Kohut to Arnold Goldberg, May 5, 1980; G. Cocks, ed., The curve of life: correspondence of Heinz Kohut 1923-1981, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, pp. 398-400; Richmond interview, Chicago, October 4, 1996; Gedo, Spleen and nostalgia, p. 111.
75 Goldberg interview, Chicago, June 22, 1981.
76 Gedo interview, Chicago, October 29, 1992; June 30, 1994; Gedo, Spleen and nostalgia, p. 111.
77 Gedo interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
78 Goldberg interview, Chicago, June 22, 1981.
79 George Moraitis, personal communication, December 1990.
80 Goldberg interview, Chicago, June 22, 1981.
81 See Moraitis interview, Chicago, August 14, 1984.
82 Algren, Chicago: city on the make, p. 86.
83 Arnold Goldberg, personal communication, December 29, 1997.
84 Examples of wealthy and prominent board members during Pollock's directorship included: Edward Neisser, an investment banker, chaired the board 1981-91; George Barr, head of the one of the nation's largest producers of aerosol products, who helped found the institute's Barr-Harris Center which helps grief-stricken children; Rhoda Pritzker, a member of one of the richest families in the US; Irving Harris, a prominent investor, rich philanthropist and sometime board president who was interested in social issues; Anne Lederer who made considerable donations (see below).
85 Gedo interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994; Moraitis, personal communication, April 16, 1991; Moraitis interview, Chicago, July 4, 1992; Goldberg interview, Chicago, June 30, 1992.
86 Moraitis personal communication, September 1990.
87 Goldberg interview, June 30, 1992.
88 Gedo interview, Chicago, October 29, 1992.
89 Tom Nicholson resigned from the board after a long conflict with George Pollock. Irving Harris who gave much money to the University of Chicago reportedly never gave that much to the institute because of his battles with Pollock and withdrew from the institute. Another board member, Jim Moss, clashed with Pollock. Kligerman recalled his experience of the contrast between Pollock's conflicts with the board and what he saw as Alexander's excellent relationship with the board (Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994).
90 For example, total assets for 1982 were $1,820,453 and for 1983 $1,940,731. Contributions and grants received during 1982 were $391,660 and 1983 $$451,809, from a large number of contributors (Institute for Psychoanalysis Annual Report, 1983).
91 Moraitis, personal communication, April 16, 1991; Gunther interview, Chicago, June 30, 1992.
92 Moraitis, personal communication, April 16, 1991.
93 Gedo interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
94 Moraitis, personal communication, December 1990.
95 The situation was even worse than it looked then since candidate numbers were artificially bolstered by the 'geographic program' which brought in candidates from rather distant cities. The institute also reaped some benefit for a few years of the end of the medical requirement for entrance to an APsaA institute with the resultant larger applicant pool (Gedo interview, Chicago, October 9, 1992). However, the poor showing should be understood in the context that the Chicago Institute has been the only APsaA institute in the nation's third largest city.
96 Gunther interview, Chicago, June 30, 1992.
97 Gedo interview, Chicago, October 9, 1992.
98 Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
99 Gunther interview, Chicago, June 30, 1992.
100 Moraitis interview, Chicago, July 4, 1992.
101 Moraitis, personal communication, September 30, 1990.
102 Moraitis, personal communication, December 1990.
103 Moraitis, personal communication, September 30, 1990.
104 Moraitis, personal communication, December 1990.
105 Kligerman interview, Chicago, July 1, 1992.
106 Kligerman interview, Chicago, June 30, 1994.
107 Moraitis, personal communication, November 10, 1997.
108 Kligerman interview, Chicago, July 1, 1992.
109 For example, 'Psychiatrist accused of exploiting rich widow', Southtown Economist newspapers, May 9, 1988; 'Psychiatrist charged with exploitation', Rocky Mountain News, May 9, 1988; 'Psychiatric chief takes leave after accusations', The San Diego Union-Tribune, May 13, 1988. Articles on the subject were carried on the national and state wires of Associated Press. Later articles included: James Warren, Maurice Possley & Joseph Tybor. "As will turns": a real-world soap', Chicago Tribune, September 6, 1988; Mark Perkiss, 'Judge Declares Mistrial in Lederer Will Dispute', November 2, 1988, Associated Press, Wednesday, AM cycle; and 'Settlement ends will dispute', Law Bulletin, November 14, 1988.
110 James Warren, Maurice Possley & Joseph Tybor. "As will turns": a real-world soap', Chicago Tribune, September 6, 1988.
111 James Warren, Maurice Possley & Joseph Tybor. `"As will turns": a real-world soap', Chicago Tribune, September 6, 1988. Articles on the subject were carried on the national and state wires of Associated Press. Press articles included: 'Psychiatrist accused of exploiting rich widow', Southtown Economist newspapers, May 9, 1988; 'Psychiatrist charged with exploitation', Rocky Mountain News, May 9, 1988; 'Psychiatric chief takes leave after accusations', The San Diego Union-Tribune, May 13, 1988; Mark Perkiss, 'Judge Declares Mistrial in Lederer Will Dispute', November 2, 1988, Wednesday, AM cycle; and 'Settlement ends will dispute', Law Bulletin, November 14, 1988.
112 C.G. McDaniel, Associated Press, May 6, 1979, Sunday, AM cycle.
113 Moraitis interview, Chicago, July 4, 1992.
114 Moraitis interview, Chicago, July 4, 1992; Richmond interview, Chicago, October 10, 1996.
115 Kligerman interview, Chicago, July 1, 1992.
116 Associated Press, May 12, 1988, Thursday, AM cycle 'Prominent Psychoanalyst Under Fire Takes Leave From Chicago Institute' by Debra Hale.
117 Moraitis, personal communication, September 30, 1990.
118 Mark Perkiss, 'Judge Declares Mistrial in Lederer Will Dispute', Associated Press, November 2, 1988, Wednesday, AM cycle; 'Settlement ends will dispute', Law Bulletin, November 14, 1988.
119 Moraitis, personal communication, September 30, 1990.
120 Arnold Tobin interview, Chicago, July 1, 1992.
121 Moraitis interview, Chicago, July 4, 1992.
122 Moraitis, personal communication, January 2, 1998.
123 Moraitis interview, Chicago, July 4, 1992.
124 Richmond interview, Chicago, October 4, 1996.
125 Kligerman interview, Chicago, July 1, 1992.
126 Moraitis, personal communication, September 30, 1990.
127 Moraitis, personal communication, September 30, 1990.
128 Gedo interview, Chicago, October 29, 1992.
129 American Psychoanalytic Association, Board on Professional Standards: Committee on Institutes. ''Preliminary site visit report, Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, February 6-10, 1991', typescript, 1991, pp. 16-17.
130 Support revenues from contributions and grants were $391,660 in 1982 and $451,809 in 1983 (Institute for Psychoanalysis: Annual Report 1983). The institute consultants found that board support was declining. Contributions and benefit in 1989 was $108,000; 1990, $99.000; 1991, $84,000; 1992 (including a special gift of $40,000), $115,000. The board appeared more willing to support special projects and training programs outside the core educational programs (L. Bartling and W. Hall, 'Institute for psychoanalysis: diagnosis report for board development project', typescript, January, 1993, p. 15).
131 Gedo interview, Chicago, October 29, 1992.
132 The consultants to the Chicago Institute concluded in 1993 that the psychoanalytic profession 'is in a state of decline caused by competitive threats and a poor public image. We see no easing in the pressures that have caused this state of affairs' (L. Bartling and W. Hall, 'Institute for psychoanalysis: diagnosis report for board development project', p. 18). They neglected to point out the harm that internal issues within the profession played, especially in Chicago where the 'success' of psychoanalysis clearly had a price to pay!
133 Michael Basch interview, Chicago, July 1, 1992.
134 Moraitis, personal communication, September 30, 1990; interview, Chicago, July 4, 1992. Kligerman interview, Chicago, July 1, 1992; Gunther interview, Chicago, June 30, 1992.
135 Michael Basch interview, Chicago, July 1, 1992; Gill interview, June 30, 1992; Goldberg interview, Chicago, June 30, 1992.
136 Goldberg interview, Chicago, June 30, 1992
137 Merton Gill interview, Chicago, June 30, 1992.
138 Moraitis interview, Glencoe, October 3, 1996.
139 Tom Pappadis interview, Chicago, June 28, 1994.
140 L. Bartling and W. Hall, 'Institute for psychoanalysis: diagnosis report for board development project', typescript, January, 1993, p. 13.
141 Jerome A. Winer, M.D., 'Position paper for discussion on March 31, 1998'. Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. Unpublished paper,
142 Jerome Winer, personal communication, August 26, 1998.
143 Moraitis, personal communication, September 30, 1990; interview, Glencoe, October 2, 1996.
144 Goldberg interview, Chicago, October 4, 1996.
145 Jim Ritter, 'Analysts honor self-psychology's Chicago founder',Chicago Sun-Times, November 17, 1997.
146 Moraitis, personal communication, November 11, 1997.
147 Gedo interview, Chicago, October 29, 1992.
148 Pappadis interview, Chicago, June 28, 1994.
149 Goldberg interview, Chicago, October 4, 1996.
150 John Gedo, personal communication, December 15, 1997.
151 John Gedo, personal communication, December 10, 1997.
152 Goldberg interview, Chicago, June 30, 1992.
153 'Folklore; Judy Collins' dance card is filled with a new album, novel and 23-city tour' by Richard Knight, Chicago Tribune, June 25, 1995.
155
Kirsner, Unfree associations. Ch. 3.